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I. INTRODUCTION
In August of 2005, the Israeli government uprooted Jewish settlers from
the Gaza Strip in twenty-one communities, many of which had existed for
decades. The world's attention focused on the settlements, both because of
the historic importance of the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, and because
of the understanding that the withdrawal challenged the deeply held historic
and religious beliefs of settlers and their supporters throughout Israel. The
settlements in Gaza were not simply representative of the Israeli presence
and the country's desire for security; they were outposts in which strongly
ideological settlers expressed their belief in the Biblical connection between
the Land of Israel and the modem Jewish nation. 1 The withdrawal from the
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I See Emmanuel Sivan, The Enclave Culture, in FUNDAMENTALISM COMPREHENDED
11, 11 (Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby eds., 1995) noting that:
The imminent messianism of Gush Emunim is placed at the service of sacred
entities: the Land of Israel and the State of Israel. What results is a total sacralization
of politics .... As the Gush is certain of the sanctity of its tools (arms, settlements),
assured of oncoming success if only sufficient help from down below would be
given to divine Providence .... All the more so as the altemative is nothing short of
catastrophic: loss of the historical opportunity to hold on forever to core areas of
Eretz Yisreal, postponement of the Redemption for lack of determined human
prodding .... Hence its insistence on the massive settlement of Judea and Samaria.
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Gaza Strip was in many ways a more general test of how these deeply
religious and nationalist settlers would react to the government's new policy
of disengaging from significant portions of the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip.
There appeared good reason to expect concerted resistance to the Israeli
army and police, even serious violence and insurrection. The settlers held
beliefs that linked the retention of areas of the Land of Israel, including the
Gaza Strip, to the messianic redemption of the Jewish people. 2 Many were
associated with a particular religious ideology that placed withdrawal from
these territories among the most serious religious violations, equating
withdrawal with murder or apostasy.3 In this context, with the settlement
enterprise not just challenged but under real attack, many Israelis expected
bloodshed. In a September 2004 poll reported upon in the Israeli daily
Id. at 44; see also Menachem Friedman, Jewish Zealots: Conservative Versus Innovative,
in FUNDAMENTALISM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 159, 171-172 (Lawrence Kaplan
ed., 1992).
2 See Lawrence Susskind, Hillel Levine, Gideon Aran, Shlomo Kanial, Yair Sheleg
& Moshe Halbertal, Religious and Ideological Dimensions of the Israeli Settlements
Issue: Reframing the Narrative?, 21 NEGOT. J. 177 (Apr. 2005). Aran writes:
During the heyday of the Jewish settlement project in the disputed territories, it was
suffused with religious messianic spirit ... the key word among Gush Emunim's
hard core was redemption .... In fact, the great success of the settlement project
was fundamentally instrumental in changing the face of Jewish religiosity in general,
making it essentially messianic ....
Id. at 184; see also AVIEZER RAVITZKY, MESSIANISM, ZIONISM, AND JEWISH RELIGIOUS
RADICALISM 79-144 (Michael Swisrky & Jonathan Chipman trans., 1996); Sivan, The
Enclave Culture, in FUNDAMENTALISM COMPREHENDED, supra note 1, at 48 (noting that:
"For Gush-Emunim not only is Eretz-Israel sacred and the center of the creation, but
Judea and Samaria are its backbone, with Jerusalem and, in it, the Temple-Mount, at its
very core.").
3 This is the principle of Ye'Hareg Ve 'Al Ya 'Avor, literally translated as "You
should be killed, rather than transgress." We explain this command in more detail
later in the paper. For discussion of the implications of this perspective see Gideon
Aran, The Father, The Son, and The Holy Land: The Spiritual Authorities of Jewish-
Zionist Fundamentalism in Israel, in SPOKESMEN FOR THE DESPISED:
FUNDAMENTALIST LEADERS OF THE MIDDLE EAST 294, 313 (R. Scott Appleby ed.,
1997) (stating: "When the possibility of withdrawal from conquered territories first
publicly arose in 1974-1975, he [Rabbi Zvi Yeuda Kook] issued the authoritative
call 'Be killed rather than transgress.' This is the most far-reaching rabbinic
injunction, revered in the halakha for the most extreme cases: incest, idol worship,
and murder."); DAVID WEISBURD, JEWISH SETTLER VIOLENCE 23, 107, 108, 125
(1989).
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newspaper Yediot Aharanot, nine out of ten Israelis feared "settler violence
toward the army and police forces."4 The article noted that the "results would
be presented to a national council which would discuss the question: 'Are we
facing a danger of civil war?"' 5 The Israeli press during this period was, in
turn, full of dark predictions and dire prophecies regarding the withdrawal. 6
Such concerns were reinforced by academic studies that recognized the
potential for Jewish settler violence. 7
Events leading up to the withdrawal heightened such fears. There were
many street protests in Israel, often shown on television and reported in the
print media and on the radio. Thousands of protesters, mostly teenagers, were
arrested in illegal demonstrations. 8 Two Israelis committed suicide to protest
the withdrawal by lighting themselves on fire.9 In the most serious and tragic
4 Attila Somfelvi, Poll. The Majority Believes the Settlers will Use Violence During
Evacuation, YNET NEWS ONLINE, Sept. 5, 2004, http://www.aad-
online.org/2004/Englishsite/Englinks/25-1 1 en/aad22/1.htm.
5 1d.
6 See, e.g., Leslie Susser, Days of Rage, JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 21, 2005, at 12;
Benziman Uzi, The Stench of Panic, HAARETZ NEWS ONLINE, Apr. 14, 2005,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=564788; Yoel Marcus, Five
Evacuation Nightmares, HAARETZ NEWS ONLINE, June 24, 2005,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=591649; Amos Arel, Analysis:
Escalation Everywhere, HAARETZ NEWS ONLINE, June 30, 2005,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=594 110; Etgar Lefkovits,
Three Held for Planning to Sell Weapons to Foil Gaza Pullout, JERUSALEM POST, Mar.
25, 2005, at News 1; Etgar Lefkovits, "Rabin is Waiting for Sharon" Sticker Deemed
Incitement, JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 25, 2005, at News 3; Matthew Gutman, IDF
Toughens Stance on Radical Settlement Activists, JERUSALEM POST, May 2, 2005, at
News 3; Merav Levi, The Disengagement Process can Deteriorate into Bloodshed, NFC
NEWS ONLINE, July 3, 2005, http://www.nfc.co.il/archive/001-D-74368-OO.html?tag=22-
45-33 (noting that: "The disengagement process will deteriorate into violent behavior,
and its inevitable outcome is that there will be bloodshed, according to research
conducted by Dr. Udi Lebel from the Ben Gurion University, sponsored by the Middle
East Studies Center at the London University.") (translated from Hebrew).
7 See, e.g., EHUD SPRINZAK, BROTHER AGAINST BROTHER 300-306 (1999);
WEISBURD, supra note 3, 67-72, 133-136; IAN S. LUSTICK, FOR THE LAND AND THE
LORD: JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL 66-72 (1988).
8 Tal Rosner, Total of 3,864 Anti-Disengagement Arrests, ISRAEL REPORTER NEWS
ONLINE, Aug. 28, 2005, http://israelreporter.com/index.php/2005/08/28/; Tal Rosner, 688
Minors Detained Over Pullout Protest, YNET NEWS ONLINE, Sept. 8, 2005,
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3125034,00.html.
9 Jonathan Lis, U.S. Oleh [Immigrant] Sets Himself Alight to Protest Pullout,
HAARETZ NEWS ONLINE, Sept. 1, 2005,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=619622&contrasslD= 19;
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acts of violence, Jewish terrorists from settlements in the West Bank
murdered four Israeli Arab citizens and four Palestinian Arabs from the West
Bank in two terrorist attacks. 10
But when the withdrawal actually came, the dark predictions of violence
were unfulfilled. The withdrawal took only seven days, lasting from August
15-23, 2005. Eight thousand people were removed from their homes.
Twenty-one communities were evacuated and destroyed. There was little
physical confrontation between the settlers and the army and police. The
predominant images in the local and international media depicted settlers
who were pained to leave their homes, but offered little more than passive
resistance to the Israeli security forces. Typical scenes included religious
settlers, sometimes still wearing the phylacteries that observant Jews put on
each morning, escorted away by soldiers or police (Picture 1),1I or young
women crying and carried away from their homes (Picture 2). 12 The violence
that had been feared did not come to pass. Rather, the painful portraits of
some Israelis (settlers) asking others (police and army officers) how they
could remove families from their homes dominated the images of the
withdrawal (Picture 3).13
Woman at Netivot Roadblock Sets Herself on Fire, ISRAEL INSIDER NEWS ONLINE, Aug.
17, 2005, http://web.israelinsider.com/Artices/Briefs/6338.htm.
10 Ahiya Raved & Yaron Druckman, "Vile Act by Terrorist," YNET NEWS ONLINE,
Apr. 8, 2005, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3122725,00.html; Efrat Weiss,
IDF Increases Presence in West Bank, YNET NEWS ONLINE, Aug. 18, 2005,
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3129128,00.html.
11 BAMBILi NEWS, Online Image, Gaza Strip, Morag, Aug. 17, 2005,
http://www.bambili.com/b_gallery/view_pic id.asp?picid=35652&mylang=2.
12 BAMBILi NEWS, Online Image, Gaza Strip, Neve Dekalim, Aug. 17, 2005,
http://www.bambili.com/bgallery/view_pic-id.asp?pic_id=35686&mylang=2.
13 BAMBILi NEWS, Online Image, Gaza Strip, Neve Dekalim, Aug. 17, 2005,
http://www.bambili.com/b gallery/view pic-id.asp?pic-id=35713 &mylang=2.
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Picture 1: Israeli soldiers remove a settler wearing phylacteries and
carrying a prayer book.
Picture 2: Israeli soldiers carry away a female settler.
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Picture 3: A settler attempts to convince soldiers that it is wrong to move
children from their homes.
In this Paper, we use data collected in a field study in the settlements in
the weeks and months before the withdrawal in the Gaza Strip to examine
why the reality of the withdrawal differed so markedly from the expectations
of many observers. Our main question is why was there so little actual
violence in the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip? If the settlers had radical
ideas that would justify and encourage violence, why did violence not occur
when the government uprooted settlements? But we are also concerned with
the implications of our study for possible future Israeli government plans to
uproot settlements in the Biblical regions of Judea and Samaria, or what is
commonly termed today the "West Bank." Can we expect these future
actions to go as smoothly as those in the Gaza Strip? Is there reason to expect
more violence in these areas? To answer these questions we draw upon
additional data we collected in West Bank Jewish settlements before and
after the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.14
14 The importance of these questions is noted in the summary of a two-day
conference at Harvard Law School in October of 2004, titled: "Past, Present, and Future
of the Jewish West Bank and Gaza Settlements: The Internal Israeli Conflict." See Robert
Mnookin, The Internal Israeli Conflict: The Past, Present and Future of the Jewish West
Bank and Gaza Settlements, 21 NEGOT. J. 165 (2005).
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Our study shows that Jewish settlers in these areas hold beliefs that
potentially justify and encourage violence. Nonetheless, Jewish settlers in the
Gaza Strip also voiced what can be defined as countervailing norms that
discourage violence with other Israelis and encourage lawful behavior. We
argue that this creates a context of "normative balance" that restrained
potential violence in the Gaza Strip. Our examination of data from the West
Bank, however, suggests that normative balance is not as strongly established
and leads us to expect greater violence in challenges to settlement in that
region. We begin our Article by placing our study in historical context, and
then describe our study and the findings it generated. We then turn to the
implications of our study both for future withdrawals in Israel, and for
preventing violence more generally in conflicts with strongly ideological
subcommunities.
II. HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND
The Jewish settlement enterprise in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
began with the imposing Israeli victory of the 1967 Israeli/Arab War and the
resulting capture of territories that had strong associations with the Biblical
past of the Jewish people. 15 While these territories (particularly the West
Bank, which included the Biblical areas of Judea and Samaria) were often the
focus of early Zionist aspirations, there was little practical discussion of their
inclusion in the Jewish state before the 1967 Israeli/Arab War. But the war
and the resulting occupation of these territories sparked a revival of both
traditional religious and secular ideologies for the expansion of Jewish
sovereignty in the historic Land of Israel. Nonetheless, the organization of
those sentiments into a meaningful political movement did not come until
While presentation topics covered a range of issues relating to the settlements, three
broad themes arose from the conference. First, participants agreed that it is
important, if not fundamental, to understand the perspectives of the national
religious settlers who are the driving force behind the settlement
movement .... The Israeli government can lessen opposition to withdrawal by
showing the settlers empathy and reassurance, but only if government officials first
achieve a true understanding of the settlers' concerns.
Id. at 165-166.
15 For detailed discussion of the history of the settlement enterprise, see, for
example, Dov SCHWARTZ, FAITH AT THE CROSSROADS: A THEOLOGICAL PROFILE OF
RELIGIOUS ZIONISM (Batya Stein trans., 2002); GERSHON SHAFAT, GUSH EMUNIN: THE
STORY BEHIND THE SCENES (1995) (in Hebrew).
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after the 1973 Yom Kippur War. 16
In the beginning of 1974, an extraparliamentary political movement,
"Gush Emunim" (Block of the Faithful), was established. 17 Gush Emunim
was founded by students of Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook, the spiritual leader of
the Merkaz-HaRav Yeshiva in Jerusalem. 18 The movement had from the
outset a strong messianic element grounded in the view of redemption as a
function of settling the Promised Land. Gush Emunim could be distinguished
from earlier religious Zionist groups in that it not only encouraged the
settlement of the land, but defined the retention of the Biblical areas of Judea
and Samaria as a religious requirement that could not be abandoned. For
Rabbi Kook and his students, Israeli control of Judea and Samaria was not
merely a desirable outcome, but an absolute value which could not be
violated under any circumstances. 19
16 See Gabriel A. Almond, Emmanuel Sivan & R. Scott Appleby, Fundamentalism:
Genus and Species, in FUNDAMENTALISM COMPREHENDED 399 (Martin E. Marty & R.
Scott Appleby eds., 1995).
The first nuclei out of which Gush Emunim formed took shape after the 1967 war
when what seemed to be the miraculous victories of the Israeli forces were viewed
as ushering in the messianic era. The Yom Kippur War in 1973 made these
prospects seem problematic, but it was interpreted by Rabbi Kook the younger as
meaning that Jews must play an active role in assuring the triumph of the messianic
era .... The one mitzvah [commandment] selected by the Gush as the most
important in the age of Redemption was the reestablishment of the Jews in the entire
land of biblical Israel. The stringent behavioral requirement was to establish
settlements on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Id. at 419; see also Sivan, The Enclave Culture, in FUNDAMENTALISM COMPREHENDED,
supra note 1, at 40 (noting that for the Gush, "[the] 1973 war .... was a setback on the
way to redemption, after the huge step forward taken in 1967; it was accounted for by the
insufficient effort made toward the settlement of the recently 'liberated' parts of the Holy
Land. The founding and rise of the Gush is closely linked with this 'setback."').
17 For more information about the establishment of the Gush Emunim movement
see, for example, WEISBURD, supra note 3, at 18-22, 25; SPRINZAK, supra note 7, at 145-
155; DANNY RUBINSTEIN, ON THE LORD'S SIDE: GUSH EMUNIM (Hakibbuts Hameuchad
1982) (in Hebrew); Karen Tenenbaum & Ehud Eiran, Israeli Settlement Activity in the
West Bank and Gaza: A Brief History, 21 NEGOT. J. 171, 171-173 (2005).
18 For a description of the spiritual leaders of Gush Emunim, educated in the Merkaz
HaRav Yeshiva, see Samuel C. Heilman, Guides of the Faithful: Contemporary Religious
Zionist Rabbis, in SPOKESMEN FOR THE DESPISED: FUNDAMENTALIST LEADERS OF THE
MIDDLE EAST 328, 328-337 (R. Scott Appleby ed., 1997).
19 See generally DOv SCHWARTZ, RELIGIOUS ZIONISM: BETWEEN LOGIC AND
MESSIANISM, 59-61, 130-131, 144-145 (1999) (in Hebrew); SCHWARTZ, supra note 15,
at 116-124; Chaim I. Waxman, Messianism, Zionism, and the State of Israel, 7 MODERN
JUDAISM 175, 185-186 (1987); LUSTICK, supra note 7, at 83-85.
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This idea is apparent in the link that Gush Emunim made between the
messianic redemption of the Jewish people and the new settlements that it
would help create. From the founding of the modem Zionist enterprise in
Israel, the idea of redemption of the people of Israel through settling the land
was an important theme, especially among religious Zionists. Indeed, the
official prayer for the State of Israel of the Israeli Chief Rabbinate, penned
by Shai Agnon, the 1966 Nobel prize-winning Israeli novelist, notes that the
establishment of the Jewish State is the "first flowering of our redemption."
But for Gush Emunim, the idea of redemption was not part of a distant
yearning of a people that had reestablished a national homeland, rather, it
was something directly linked to the actions of its proponents in settling the
lands captured from Jordan and Egypt in the 1967 War.
In turn, following Rav Zvi Yehuda Kook, Gush Emunim defined the
retention of these territories as a principal Ye'Hareg Ve'Al Ya'Avor, for
which a Jew must be willing to be "killed rather than transgress. '20 The
application of this Talmudic dictum to settlement in the territories captured in
1967 had significant meaning for this community of devoutly religious Jews.
A dominant legal principle that is applied to observance of Jewish
commandments is what is commonly referred to as the principal of Pikuach
Nephesh, the saving of life. 21 The rabbis of the Talmud argue that Jewish
Law was created to preserve life, and thus when life is threatened the
individual is not only allowed but required to transgress the
commandments. 22 For example, a person is obligated to violate the Sabbath
to save a life. But there are very specific limits to this principle, and these are
the commandments defined as Ye 'Hareg Ve 'Al Ya 'Avor. By placing the issue
of retention and settlement of the territories as Ye'Hareg Ve'Al Ya'Avor,
Rabbi Kook and Gush Emunim established withdrawal from these areas as
similar to murder, apostasy and sexual incest, the three main sins which one
is not allowed to commit to save one's own life or the life of others.
In the 1970s and early 1980s, Gush Emunim played a central role in the
development of settlements in the West Bank.23 Indeed, Amana, the
2 0 YAAKOV ZISBERG, YE'HAREG VE'AL YA'AVOR IN THE STRUGGLE FOR ERETZ
YISRAEL [the Land of Israel]: RABBI KOOK'S PRINCIPLE (2003) (in Hebrew), available at
http://www.kipa.co.il/upload/users_files/1020/pdf.; Aran, supra note 2, at 313;
WEISBURD, supra note 3, at 23, 107.
21 Ezra Kopelowitz & Matthew Diamond, Religion that Strengthens Democracy: An
Analysis of Religious Political Strategies in Israel, 27 THEORY & SOC'Y 671, 691-699
(1998); Clive Jones, Ideo-Theology and the Jewish State: From Conflict to Conciliation?,
26 BRIT. J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 9, 14 (1999); LUSTICK, supra note 7, at 95, 109.
22 Kopelowitz & Diamond, supra note 21, at 695-696.
23 For a description of the history of the Gush Emunim settlement movement, see
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settlement movement of Gush Emunim, was instrumental in creating such
settlements as Elon Moreh, Ofra, Kedummin, and Beit El, often with initial
resistance from the Israeli government. By the 1980s, however, Gush
Emunim as a political movement declined, most of its prominent leaders
having moved on to other political or extraparliamentary groups.
Nonetheless, the ideological principles of the group, including the centrality
of the Biblical Land of Israel and the right of the Jewish people to settle the
land, were firmly established in the more general settlement movement.
The settlement movement was in turn aided by strong government
support by Prime Minister Menachem Begin in the 1980s.24 In this regard,
Ariel Sharon, later to lead the government that would uproot Gaza settlers,
was critical in providing essential resources and infrastructure for the
establishment of settlements at that time.25 By the mid-1980s, the population
in Judea and Samaria approximated 46,000 Jewish settlers in 113
settlements.26 In 1992, there were about 137 settlements with a population of
107,000 settlers, including those living in the Gaza Strip.27 By 2004,
approximately 140 Jewish settlements existed in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip, with a population of approximately 230,000 people.28 Since the mid-
1980s the Yesha (Judea, Samaria and Gaza) Council has functioned as the
formal leadership organization of the settlement movement. 29
WEISBURD, supra note 3, at 24-48; LUSTICK, supra note 7, at 42-71.
24 Tenenbaum & Eiran, supra note 17, at 172-173.
25 See Neve Gordon, The Triumph of Greater Israel, NAT'L CATH. REP., Nov.
12, 2004, at 18 (noting that: "[A]s chair of the government's Settlement Committee
he [Ariel Sharon] initiated a massive settlement enterprise in the Occupied
Territories .... within less than four years Mr. Sharon managed to build 62 new
settlements, completely changing the landscape of the West Bank and Gaza Strip");
see also SHAFAT, supra note 15, at 331-357.
26 LUSTICK, supra note 7, at 47.
27 See ANAT ROTH, THE SECRET OF ITS STRENGTH: THE YESHA COUNCIL AND ITS
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE SECURITY FENCE AND THE DISENGAGEMENT PLAN 38 (2005) (in
Hebrew), available at: http://www.idi.org.il/english/catalog.asp?pdid=474&did=40)
(English abstract only); THE MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE FOR PEACE, ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS
IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: SPECIAL REPORT 7 (2002),
http://www.fmep.org/reports/specialreports/nollmarch2002/FMEPSR-hebrewMarch
2002.pdf.
2 8 See CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF ISRAEL 2004
No. 55, 2-27 (2004); Foundation for Middle East Peace, Settlements in the West Bank,
http://www.fmep.org/settlementinfo/statsdata/westbanksettlements.html.
29 The name Yesha is an acronym using the initials of the Hebrew words for Judea,
Samaria and Gaza. Its literal meaning in Hebrew is "salvation." For a description of the
role of the Yesha Council in the settlement movement see David Newman, From
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A. Jewish Settler Violence
Any Israeli settlement disengagement plan has to consider the potential
for active-and violent-resistance from settlers, not only against the Israeli
Army and police, but against the Arab population as well. There is an
unfortunate precedent of settler violence when the settlement enterprise has
appeared threatened. Following the Camp David Accords with Egypt in
1978, a Jewish settler underground group carried out a series of violent acts
against Arabs in the West Bank.30 Police charged the group with planning to
blow up the Dome of the Rock on Jerusalem's Temple Mount, attempts to
assassinate the Arab mayors of West Bank cities, a terrorist attack on the
Islamic College in Hebron in which three Palestinian civilians were
murdered and thirty-three were injured, and attempting to blow up five buses
with Arab passengers in East Jerusalem. 31 The members of the group were
eventually apprehended and sentenced to prison.32
Violence by individuals associated with the settlement movement has
rocked Israeli society at various points. The killing of Emil Greenzweig 33 at a
"Peace Now" 34 rally in Jerusalem in February 1983 shocked many Israelis
Hitnachalut to Hitnatkut: The Impact of Gush Emunim and the Settlement Movement on
Israeli Politics and Society, 10 ISRAEL STUD. 192 (2005).
30 Ehud Sprinzak, Fundamentalism, Terrorism, and Democracy: The Case of Gush
Emunim Underground, 5-8 (The Wilson Center, 1986); Joel Beinin, Is Terrorism a
Useful Term in Understanding the Middle East and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict?, 85
RADICAL HIST. REv. 12, 15 (2003); Ehud Sprinzak, The Emergence of the Israeli Radical
Right, 21 COMP. POL. 171, 171, 176-177 (1989); Robert I. Friedman, Inside the Jewish
Terrorist Underground, 15 J. PALESTINE STUD. 190, 194-197 (1986).
31 CrimC (Jer) 203/84 Israel v. Menachem Ben Livni and others, [1985] IsrDC
1989-90(3) 330, 331-332; Sprinzak, The Emergence of the Israeli Radical Right, supra
note 30, at 176-177. For a detailed discussion of the Jewish Underground see HAGGAI
SEGAL, DEAR BROTHERS: THE WEST BANK JEWISH UNDERGROUND (1988); SPRINZAK,
supra note 7, at 145-179.
32 CrimC (Jer) 203/84, supra note 31, at 335-336, 435-445.
33 To learn about Emil Greenzweig's life story see The Adam Institute for
Democracy and Peace, Emil Greenzweig in Memoriam, 2002,
http://www.adaminstitute.org.il/emil.pdf, Michel Feige, Rescuing the Person from the
Symbol: "Peace Now" and the Ironies of Modern Myth, 11 HIST. & MEMORY 141, 141,
148 (1999).
34 Peace Now was formed in 1978 as an extraparliamentary movement to pressure
Prime Minister Menachem Begin's government to advance the peace accords and
territorial compromises with Egypt. Later on, the movement was active in opposing
Israel's 1982 invasion and occupation of Lebanon, and struggled against the Jewish
settlements erected in the occupied territories. See SPRINZAK, supra note 7, at 177-179;
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who believed that there were clear boundaries to political discord within
Israel.35 Greenzweig, a left wing activist and army officer, participated in a
protest against the Likud government's failure to implement the
recommendations of an investigative committee examining the massacres in
Sabra and Shatila.36 The committee laid some of the blame for the massacre
on Defense Minister Ariel Sharon. 37 Right wing extremists confronted the
protesters. 38 At the end of the demonstration, a hand grenade was thrown at
the activists, killing Greenzweig and injuring nine others. 39 Though the
perpetrator was not a settler, people generally associated the act with the
settlement movement since a central component of Peace Now's political
platform called for removal of settlers from the occupied territories.40
The most violent incident by a Jewish settler occurred at the Cave of the
Patriarchs in Hebron, holy to both Jews and Muslims as the place where
Abraham and his descendents were buried. Baruch Goldstein, a Jewish
physician from Kiryat Arba, a nearby Jewish settlement, opened fire on a
group of Arab worshippers killing 29 and wounding 125 others.41 Soon
Michel Feige, Peace Now and The Legitimating Crisis of "Civil Militarism, " 3 ISRAELI
STUD. 85, 90-91 (1998). For the movement's current activities, see Peace Now,
http://www.peacenow.org.il/site/en/homepage.asp (last visited Aug. 15, 2006).
35 SPRINZAK, supra note 7, at 212-213; Feige, supra note 33, at 149-150.
36 Lebanese Marionte Christians murdered hundreds of Palestinians in the Sabra and
Shatila refugee camps near Beirut on September 1982. While the Israeli Army itself was
not accused of participating in the massacre, some argued that the very presence of Israeli
troops in the area enabled its occurrence and therefore then-Israeli Defense Minister Ariel
Sharon had "personal responsibility", according to the Israeli investigative committee
(the Kahan Commission). See THE KAHAN COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF
INQUIRY INTO THE EVENTS AT THE REFUGEE CAMPS IN BEIRUT (Feb. 8, 1983), available at
http://www.caabu.org/press/documents/kahan-commission-part9.html.
37 Eyal Weisman, Strategic Points, Flexible Lines, Tense Surfaces, Political
Volumes: Ariel Sharon and the Geometry of Occupation, 35 PHIL. F. 221, 232 (2004);
Feige, supra note 34, at 90-91.
38 For a detailed description of the demonstration see KAHAN COMMISSION, Street
Violence from the Right, 12 J. PALESTINE STUD. 209 (1983).
39 CrimA 154/85 Yona Avrushmi v. The State of Israel [1987] IsrSC 41(1), 94, 387.
40 SPRINZAK, supra note 7, at 178: "Peace Now became the nemesis of Gush
Emunim and Kach, triggering plenty of aggression and hate literature. This rivalry
reached crisis proportions in 1983 when a Peace Now activist .... was killed." Id.
41 Jacov Shamir & Khalil Shikaki, Self Serving Perception of Terrorism Among
Israelis and Palestinians, 23 POL. PSYCHOL. 537, 543, 545 (2002); Benny Morris, After
Rabin, 25 J. PALESTINE STUD. 77, 85 (1996).
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afterwards, Israel outlawed the radical "Kach" political movement 42 with
which Goldstein was associated.4 3
Perhaps the most prominent act of violence associated with the
settlement movement was the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzchak
Rabin by a young law student from Bar Ilan University, Igal Amir. While
Amir was not a settler, he killed Rabin to prevent the Prime Minister from
continuing with a policy of placing areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip
under Arab control. Amir described his ideology while testifying during his
trial:
I didn't do it [Rabin's assassination] in order to stop the Peace Process.
There is no such thing as a "Peace Process." It's a process of war ... A
Palestinian state is being established here, and an army of terrorists is being
equipped with weapons for "Peace" purposes. The Halacha [Jewish Legal]
commandment is to kill a Jew who gives up the Land and the People of
Israel to the enemy.., this commandment is more important than the
42 The Kach movement, started by the American Rabbi Meir Kahane, is generally
considered to be more radical than Gush Emunim, and less integrated into Israeli society.
We found relatively little support for the Kach movement in the settlements that we
studied. Samuel Heilman notes:
Another Rabbi who had sought to guide the faithful, and whose impact was also felt,
posthumously, in the turn toward violence, was Meir Kahane... he embraced the
ideals of Zionism, which he wed to his own militancy, theology, and politics of
confrontation. Underscoring the implicit ethnocentrism of Zionism and mixing it
with the [B]iblical idea of a separate and superior Jewish people, he formed the idea
that for Israel to be a Jewish state demanded that it actively rid itself of Arabs,
whose very presence undermined the purity and promise of the Jewish character of
Israel .... Kahane wanted not just to transfer Arabs out of the Jewish state but to
transform Israel into an Orthodox Jewish entity .... Moreover,
Kahanism... included an animosity to democracy, which is viewed as a doctrine
that allowed the people rather than God to decide what was right. If democracy
could allow the state to be taken over by a secular and heretical government that
gave Jewish land to Arabs, endangering Jewish life and the Jewish future,
democracy had to be set aside.
Heilman, Guides of the Faithful: Contemporary Religious Zionist Rabbis, in SPOKESMEN
FOR THE DESPISED: FUNDAMENTALIST LEADERS OF THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 18, at
355-356. For a description of the Kach movement ideology, and its relationship to
the ideological perspectives that led to Prime Minister Rabin's assassination see
Jones, supra note 21, at 15-18 (1999); SPRINZAK, supra note 7, at 180-226, 265,
274.
43 Robert Paine, Behind the Hebron Massacre, 11 ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY 8, 9, 13-
14 (1995).
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prohibition against murder.44
The ideological background of the settlement movement and these acts
of violence provided cogent reasons for Israeli fears that the withdrawal from
the Gaza Strip would lead to violence and even insurrection. For the first
time, a large-scale settlement enterprise in the Land of Israel was being
uprooted. 4 5 It certainly seemed reasonable to expect that violence would be
worse than before, now that the ideological framework of many settlers was
finally being tested. In turn, a number of rabbis aligned with the settlement
movement reiterated rulings that made it illegitimate to remove settlements,
and many called for soldiers to disobey any such orders. 46
44 See CrimC (TA) 498/95 Israel v. Igal Amir, [1996] IsrDC 1996(1), 3411, at 3426,
22(c).
45 The settlements in the Sinai Peninsula that were uprooted in 1982 as part of the
peace agreement with Egypt were generally not considered by religious authorities to fall
within the boundaries of the Land of Israel. See WEISBURD, supra note 3, at 47-48.
46 See Larry Derfiner, Answering to A Higher Authority, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 22,
2004, at Features 10; Nadav Shragai & Amos Harel, Two Top Rabbis Now Urge Troops
to Personally Refuse Evacuation, HAARETZ NEWS ONLINE, Oct. 10, 2004,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=490415; Nadav Shragai, Sign
The Petition! Refuse to Participate! HAARETZ NEWS ONLINE, Dec. 8, 2004,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=511487; ISRAEL INSIDER
NEWS ONLINE, YESHA Council Backs Call for Civil Disobedience Against Expulsion
Law, Dec. 20, 2004, http://web.israelinsider.com/Articles/Briefs/4621.htm; Efrat Weiss
and Hanan Greenberg, "I Want to See Civil Disobedience," YNET NEWS ONLINE, Apr. 27,
2005, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3077784,00.html; CBS News Online,
Israeli Settlers Told To Resist: Mass Civil Disobedience Feared; Sharon Closer To New
Coalition, Dec. 20, 2004,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/12/21/world/main662313.shtml; Einat Brazilai,
How and to Where Do We Continue, MA'ARiv NEWS ONLINE, Aug. 22, 2005,
http://www.nrg.co.il/online/11/ART/974/388.html. (in Hebrew). Brazilai notes that:
Expressing his opinion, Rabbi Shapira, who had been the head of the Yeshiva
"Merkaz Ha'rav", wrote that any command that opposes the Halakha and which
forces a violation of the Torah does not have any validity; it is prohibited to
follow the command, and no-one has the authority to give such a command. A
soldier who gets such an order which is against the Torah must follow the
religious Torah commandment and not the secular order. Just as we are not
allowed to violate the Shabbat or eat non-Kosher food, we are also not allowed
to uproot Jews from their homes.
Id. (translated from Hebrew by the authors).
[Vol. 22:1 2006]
TOWARD A PERSPECTIVE OF NORMATIVE BALANCE
B. Recent Developments and the Disengagement Plan
By 2005, the settlement movement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
expanded beyond the ideological core of its original proponents. By the time
of the withdrawal over 220,000 Israelis lived in these areas, and many of
them had been attracted not by ideological fervor, but economic incentives.47
Yair Sheleg, a senior researcher at the Israel Democracy Institute, estimates
that about 80,000 settlers are living in outposts that were established
primarily as "quality of life" settlements. 48 These are mostly secular
communities built close to the 1967 boundaries, within easy commuting
distance to Israel's major population centers.
Differences also exist between the Gaza Strip and settlements and those
in the heartland of Judea and Samaria. While the establishment of settlements
in Judea and Samaria were originally opposed by the government and
founded after a series of struggles with the Israeli authorities, 49 settlements in
the Gaza Strip, first established toward the end of the 1970s, were initiated
by the Israeli government. 50 Also, many Samaria settlements are located near
to or are in heavily populated Palestinian areas, leading to conflict over land
and transportation routes. In contrast, most settlements in the Gaza Strip are
located in abandoned areas relatively far from Arab population centers.
This geographic distance led to relatively few conflicts between settlers
in Gaza and the Palestinian population until 1987, when the first Intifada or
"uprising" broke out. The security situation deteriorated with the second
Intifada at the end of the year 2000. All connections between Arab and
Jewish populations were cut off completely at that time, and until their
evacuation, the settlements endured almost constant attacks from neighboring
Arab communities. 51
The relinquishment of many areas of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
to the Palestinians was a central component of the Oslo Accords signed in
47 See YAIR SHELEG, POLICY PAPER No. 5E: THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL
RAMIFICATIONS OF EVACUATING SETITLEMENTS IN JUDEA, SAMARIA, AND THE GAZA STRIP
38-39 (2004), available at
http://www.idi.org.il/english/catalog.asp?pdid=349&tmp= 1 &did=39.
48 Id.
49 SHAFAT, supra note 15, at 64-89.
50 SHELEG, supra note 47, at 17-18; LUSTICK, supra note 7, at 46-47; Gordon, supra
note 25, at 18.
51 See Rema Hammami & Salim Tamari, The Second Uprising: End or New
Beginning?, 30 J. PALESTINE STUD. 5, 12-16 (2001).
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August of 1993.52 Ironically, the actual withdrawal process would only be
initiated much later by one of the strongest proponents of the settlement
movement, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. Frustrated with the breakdown of
negotiations with the Palestinians, yet interested in changing the facts on the
ground, Sharon decided to advocate a policy of unilateral withdrawal from
the Gaza Strip. Sharon first announced the disengagement plan during a
speech at the Hertzeliya Conference in December 2003. 53 Many pundits from
different political camps suspected it to be no more than a momentary
political spin, a ploy by someone who for many years was considered the
founder of the settlement movement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
54
Nevertheless, the disengagement plan was soon set into motion, and Sharon,
once the hero of the settlement movement, became its greatest threat.
On February 16, 2005, the Israeli Parliament passed into law the
Implementation of the Evacuation Plan Act (the Act).55 The Act enabled the
cabinet to evacuate settlements and withdraw from the Gaza Strip and the
northern area of Samaria. 56 The Act also empowered the prime minister and
minister of defense to limit civilian access to these territories, 57 defined
criminal sanctions against Israeli citizens who disobeyed the evacuation
order,58 and ensured compensation and support for settlers during the process
of dismantling and relocation of the population.59 One essential condition in
the Act states that the decision to evacuate each settlement should be made at
least five months prior to the actual evacuation. 60
The order of actual disengagement was made and signed on February 20,
52 Rema Hammami & Salim Tamari, Anatomy of Another Rebellion, 217 MIDDLE E.
2, 3 (2000).
53 Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, The Herzliya Address at the 4th Annual Herzliya
Conference (Dec. 2003), available at
http://www.herzliyaconference.org/Eng/ Articles/Article.asp?ArticlelD=892&Categoryl
D=153.
54 See, e.g., Gil Hofinan, Sharon Pressures NRP, Netanyahu to Stay in Coalition,
JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 7, 2004, at News 1. Quoting Knesset Member Dalya Itzik: "I
have gotten so many messages over the last few weeks and nothing has come out of any
of them, so I long ago stopped taking them seriously .... This is all a spin campaign of
the Prime Minister's Office that must be viewed with suspicion." Id.
55 The Knesset, The Knesset Announces the Implementation of the Evacuation Plan
Act, http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/asp/event-frame.asp?id=58 (in Hebrew).
56 Id. at 142.
57 Id. at 149-150.
58 Id. at 150.
59 Id. at 144-145; 148-149; 152-156.
60 Id. at 149.
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2005.61 Consequently, the actual disengagement was set to begin on July 20,
2005.62 Two months later, the date for actual disengagement was extended to
August 15, 2005. The period between February and the withdrawal was of
one of political tension, as members of the Israeli parliament opposing the
disengagement tried to topple the government or pressure it-with help from
the Yesha Council and other anti-withdrawal groups-to conduct a national
referendum before the actual disengagement was implemented. 63 However,
on March 28, 2005, the Israeli parliament voted 72 to 39 to reject the option
of a referendum. 64
On July 13, 2005, Sharon signed the closure order for Gaza, making the
area a closed military zone. Police permitted only Gaza residents to enter the
area. On July 18, approximately 70,000 protestors tried to march illegally to
Gaza. Significant police and army forces blocked the roads, forcing the
protestors to gather in a nearby village called Kefar Mimon. 65 The protest
march ended on July 21 after police prevented protesters from continuing to
Gush Katif.66 Despite this, antidisengagement protestors, most of them from
the West Bank, managed to sneak in to the area by foot through fields. By the
time the evacuation began, a few thousand infiltrators were in Gaza
61 Press Release, Prime Minister's Office, PM Sharon and DM Mofaz Sign Orders




63 See Gil Hofman, Right Targets Sharon in Outpost Scandal; Rebels Aim to Stop
Pullout Legally if not Politically, JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 10, 2005, at News I (quoting
the leader of the Likud rebels, Uzi Landau: "Besides using legal means disengagement
can still be prevented politically in three ways: by stopping the budget, forcing a national
referendum, or passing a motion to disperse the "Knesset."); Mazal Mualem, Likud
Rebels Claim Battle Isn't Over Yet, HAARETZ NEWS ONLINE, Mar. 29, 2005,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=557955.
64 Gideon Alon & Nadav Shragai, Referendum Bill Fails; Settlers Vow to Take to
Streets, HAARETZ NEWS ONLINE, Mar. 29, 2005,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=557965.
65 Matthew Gutman & Yakov Katz, Protesters Still Intent on Reaching Gaza: Police
May Storm Kfar Maimon to Force Them Home, JERUSALEM POST, July 20, 2005, at News
1; Matthew Gutman & Yaakov Katz, Police Hold Firm as Gaza Protest Fizzles,
JERUSALEM POST, July 21, 2005, at News 1.
66 Amos Harel & Nir Hasson, IDF: We can't Seal Gaza Hermetically, HAARETZ
NEWS ONLINE, July 22, 2005,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.j html?itemNo=60329 1.
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illegally.67 But, as we noted at the outset of this Article, the evacuation of
settlers and settlements was to pass with little actual violence.
III. THE STUDY
Our research was designed to examine the potential for violence in the
event of Israeli withdrawals from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. We sought
to identify the main themes that characterized the ethos of settlers and their
narratives on ideology, violence, and the legitimacy of law and government
actions. At the outset, we made two strategic decisions regarding our sample
and our approach. First, we decided to focus our research on ordinary settlers
and not on the leaders who have often dominated public and academic
discussion of the settlement movement, as we thought that a good deal was
already known about the leadership. Moreover, while we recognized the
importance of leadership, and indeed spoke to a number of settlement leaders
in the course of our study, we thought that it was critical to go beyond what
leaders said to what the bulk of settlers believed and what they were willing
to do in response to government threats to the settlement enterprise. As we
will describe below, we used open-ended interviews and surveys to gain a
portrait of settler attitudes.
While we wanted to gain a broader view of settler attitudes, we also
wanted to focus on more ideological and more isolated settlements. Our focus
is on the potential for violence in the case of a withdrawal by the Israeli
government, and in this context it did not make sense for us to expend scarce
resources for our study on the entire settlement community. Instead, we
identified two main criteria for selecting settlements for study. The first
criterion was that the settlements selected must have been ideologically
associated with the Gush Emunim movement or other groups that had been
known as strong advocates of settlement and opposed to any withdrawal
from the territories. The second criterion was that the settlement appeared
very likely to be uprooted in the context of withdrawals from the West Bank
and Gaza Strip.
67 Ze'ev Schiff, Infiltrating the Gaza Strip, HAARETz NEWS ONLiNE, Aug. 8, 2005,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=609631; Amos Harel & Nir
Hasson, Scores of Pullout Foes Continue to Infiltrate Gaza, HAARETZ NEWS ONLINE,
Aug. 11, 2005, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=611158.
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A. Selection of the Sample of Settlements
We began our sample selection with twenty-two settlements that David
Weisburd surveyed in an earlier study of the Gush Emunim movement.68
Drawing from this earlier study allowed us to identify settlements with strong
ideological attachments since their founding. 69 Using data from Weisburd's
study, we ranked each of the twenty-two settlements in ascending order of
"level of radicalism" based on three diffei'ent variables. 70 From the list of the
ten most radical settlements in Weisburd's sample, we chose five settlements
using various considerations such as geographic location and religious
orientation.71 To choose a second group 72 of five settlements that was not
dependent on the earlier study, we asked settlers interviewed in the first
group to describe which of the settlements in the area they considered to be
the most "ideological" or most "radical," a selection technique that is a
variant of "snowball" 73 sampling.
We initiated the research proposal before the disengagement plan was
introduced to the public. Nonetheless, when the actual field work started, the
prospect and implications of the disengagement were evident and became
more tangible with time. These historical events led to specific adjustments
in the original research plan. First, we increased the number of settlements in
the Gaza Strip we intended to study. Second, we added participant
observations at antiwithdrawal demonstrations. Finally, we did not include
one of the settlements we studied, Mevo Dotan, in the analyses that follow.
While established in 1977 as a Gush Emunim settlement, when we arrived
for our study there were few people left at the outpost, and those remaining
68 For the list of the 22 settlements that Weisburd studied see WEISBURD, supra note
3, at 11.
69 It also allows us to track changes over time in the settlements by comparing our
findings to those reported by Weisburd in the prior study. See id. These changes are the
focus of another paper that is in progress.
70 The three variables are "percentage of support for vigilantism in the settlement,"
id. at 70; "percentage of reported participation of male settlers in vigilantism," id. at 71;
and "percentage of support for passive resistance," id. at 113.
71 The five settlements chosen as the first group were Beit-Yatir, Shilo, Kefar-
Tapuach and Mevo-Dotan from Judea and Samaria, and Atzmona from the Gaza Strip.
72 The five settlements chosen as the second group were Rachelim from Samaria,
Susia from Judea and Neve-Dekalim, Gane-Tal and Shirat Ha'Yam from the Gaza Strip.
73 See BERNARD H. RUSSELL, RESEARCH METHODS IN ANTHROPOLOGY:
QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE APPROACHES 180-202 (AltaMira Press 3d ed. 2002);
ROYCE A. SINGLETON, BRUCE C. STRAITS & MARGARET MILLER STRAITS, APPROACHES
TO SOCIAL RESEARCH 164-165, 329, 336-337 (2d ed. 1993).
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were not strongly ideological, claiming that they would be happy to leave if
the government offered them compensation.
The disengagement plan created an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion
among settlers, which forced us to spend considerable time and effort in
order to gain settler cooperation. Of the settlements we originally selected for
the study, only one, Sa-Nur, did not give us permission to interview and
survey its members. Another settlement, Shilo, originally refused to allow us
entry but eventually agreed to allow us to conduct our survey. Sa-Nur was
one of four settlements that were evacuated from the north of Samaria.
During the second Intifada, due to extreme security difficulties, it was almost
completely abandoned by its original population. At the time we conducted
our research Sa-Nur was populated mostly by a small group of settlers who
came there to try to prevent the evacuation.
Our sample does not represent a random sample of settlements in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip, but rather a group of settlements that would be
considered among the most radical and isolated.74 The settlements we chose
were known in the settlement movement as strongly "ideological"
settlements, and the communities were located in areas that were either slated
for withdrawal in the disengagement plan or that were not part of large
settlement blocks and therefore assumed to be vulnerable to a potential future
withdrawal. All of the surveyed settlements are outside the proposed route of
the security fence under construction to separate Israel from the West Bank.
Table 1 below lists general characteristics of the settlements we
surveyed. Overall, with the exception of Neve Dekalim in the Gaza Strip, a
town with 500 families, the settlements were small outposts of 25 to 180
households. They were generally founded in the late 1970s or early 1980s.
Only one settlement, Shirat-Ha'Yam, was established in the last ten years.
The average residency in the settlements varied between five and twenty-one
years. 75 We do not report length of residency for Shirat-Ha'Yam because
many of the settlers we surveyed there had come only recently in order to try
to prevent the implementation of the disengagement plan. As expected, given
our sampling approach, the settlements were composed overwhelmingly of
74 There are other settlements in the West Bank, such as the Jewish communities in
Hebron, Kiryat Arba and Itzhar, which are known to be very radical and are not in our
sample. Importantly, during the months leading to the disengagement many of the most
ideological settlers from those settlements moved to the Gaza Strip in order to try to
prevent the disengagement. We interviewed a number of these settlers in the Gaza
settlement of Shirat-Ha'Yam.
75 Statistics regarding residency and religiosity are drawn from our settler survey
described in detail in the next section.
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religious Jews. The geographic locations of the settlements are detailed in
Figure 1.
Table 1: Characteristics of Settlements
escriptive Year Number of Avg. years Secular
Settlement Numerof of
Region established households residency A
Atzmona* 1978 80 11.6 None
Gane-Tal* 1979 70 21 2.5%
Gaza Neve-Deaim 1983 500 14.4 5%Dekalim*
Shirat-
_haa 2001 25 
--- NoneHa'Yam*
Shilo 1978 180 15.5 None
Kefar- 1978 90 8.7 8%
Samaria Tapoach
Rechelim 1991 35 4.7 None
Beit yatir 1979 70 14 6%
Judea
Susia 1983 100 11 None
* These settlements were evacuated August 15-23, 2005.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Figure 1: Location of Sampled Settlements
B. Interviewing and Surveying Settlers
In-depth semistructured interviews were conducted with both settlement
leaders and ordinary settlers. We initiated the first contact with the settlement
by approaching their political or spiritual leaders. The interviews with leaders
focused mainly on the social and political history of the settlement and
conflicts with the government and Arabs. Interviews with settlers focused on
the personal history of the interviewees, their decisions to settle in the
territories, attitudes toward Israeli society, and beliefs regarding possible
dismantlement of settlements and reactions to such decisions.
Selection of ordinary settlers for our interview sample was developed
using a snowball sampling approach in which we tried to locate settlers
whom others considered more ideological. Overall, we conducted sixty-four
in-depth interviews with settlers and settlement leaders, thirty in the Gaza
Strip and thirty-four in the West Bank. The interviews lasted between 30-120
minutes, and were based on a standard open-ended interview instrument. We
also conducted fifty field observations and sixty short interviews at
antiwithdrawal demonstrations. The protestors were asked mainly about the
actions they planned to take in trying to prevent the disengagement.
We began to survey settlers on July 25, 2005, about three weeks before
the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. We completed 149 surveys of settlers in
the Gaza Strip and 108 in the West Bank before, the withdrawal. We
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conducted an additional 108 surveys in the West Bank a month after the
withdrawal. Our approach to the survey was to go door to door in each of the
settlements we studied. We chose this approach over a mail survey because
we thought that many settlers would ignore a mail survey, especially
considering the heightened tension in the settlements in the period
immediately before the disengagement. We also thought we would have
greater success in approaching people directly rather than simply calling
them on the phone.
For settlements with less than one hundred households, we tried to gain a
response from each household. In the larger settlements of Neve Dekalim and
Shilo, we used a sampling technique in which we tried to get a response from
every fifth house (Neve Dekalim) or second house (Shilo). We employed
four to five researchers in each day of surveying, trying to finish the survey
in each settlement as quickly as possible. In the Gaza Strip, many households
were already empty when we arrived, presumably because their residents had
already left. In cases where people were not at home, we would return to the
household at least twice. Our response rate for households in which an adult
was at home was 80%.
As Table 2 below indicates, most of the settlers we surveyed were
married and had large families. 76 Indeed, in seven of the settlements the
average number of children for married families was above four. This can be
compared to the average number of 2.9 children for Israeli families
generally. 77 Overall, the average age of respondents in our study was in their
thirties. Over half of the people we surveyed had college degrees, a figure
much higher than the 19% with degrees among the general Israeli
population. 78
76 Our sample was not equally weighted between men and women. About 63% of
our respondents were women, and we have no reason to believe that women were
overrepresented in the settlements overall. The reason for over-sampling is because men
were less likely to be at home during the hours we conducted the survey, and we did not
purposely over-sample men when a husband and wife were both available (and we took
only one survey from each household). Because of the possible biases that this might
create in our description of the settlers, we compared men and women on the variables
examined in this paper. We did not find any meaningful or statistically significant
differences.
77 Figures concerning the general population are taken from the CENTRAL BUREAU
OF STATISTICS, supra note 28, at 2-27.
78 Id. at 12-25.
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Table 2: Characteristics of Settlers
esrgtive Mean Mean College
Settlement Marriage number age degree
Region % of children %
Atzmona 89% 6.4 39 48%
Gane-Tal 87% 4.1 39.5 52%
Neve-DeKalim 85% 5.0 38 33%
Shirat Ha'Yam 53% 4.4 27 45%
Shilo 89% 5.6 39 52%
Samaria Kefar-Tapoach 67% 1.85 32 39%
Rechelim 100% 2.5 28 80%
Beit yatir 78% 4.8 38 57%
Susia 89% 5.6 36.5 61%
IV. THE POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE
A. Did the Settlers in the Gaza Strip Have Radical Beliefs that
Would Justify and Encourage Violence?
In order to examine why there was little violence among Jewish settlers
in the Gaza Strip at the time of the withdrawal, we need to first ask whether
these settlers in fact expressed ideologies that would support violence. While
it has been assumed that these settlers had radical beliefs that might justify
and encourage violence, systematic evidence of this assumption had not been
collected before our study. In turn, if the settlers did not have radical beliefs
that might support violence, then we could explain the lack of resistance
quite easily.
Table 3 displays four variables from our survey that capture elements of
settler ideologies that might justify violence. We include in this table only
responses gathered from the Gaza Strip and classify responses to the
statement as disagreement, agreement, or a central tenet of the settler's world
view.
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Table 3: Ideologies that Potentially Justify Violence for Settlers in the
Gaza Strip
Agreement Level A central
tenet of my I agree I disagree N valid
Tenet worldview
Settling in Yesha is part of the
process of the redemption of 62% 33% 5% 125
Israel (Geulat Yisrael).
A withdrawal from Yesha will 36% 35% 29% 118
prevent Geulat Yisrael.
Renunciation of any part of
Eretz Israel is Ye'Hareg Ve'Al 31% 35% 34% 111
Ya 'Avor.
History will judge those who
assist in the evacuation of the 30% 48% 22% 110
settlements as traitors.
As is apparent, nearly all of the settlers agree with the proposition that
settling in Judea, Samaria and Gaza is part of the process of the redemption
of the Jewish people, and almost two-thirds argue that this is a central tenet
of their world view. More than two-thirds also agree that "a withdrawal from
any part of the Land of Israel" will prevent the messianic redemption of
Israel. Taking into account that this is a strongly religious population, the
messianic connection between settlement and the land provides a powerful
brew for possible justifications for violence. As one settler from the Gaza
Strip told us:
We come to Eretz Israel with an enormous mission: to mend the world in
God's kingdom... but this can be done only when the whole nation of
Israel is connected to the Land of Israel. Without this there can be no
completion of that mission: not for the people of Israel, not for the land and
not for the world.., each Gentile that interrupts the connection between the
Jewish people and their land also interrupts Tikun Olam [the mending of the
world], interrupts its salvation, interrupts completion, and disrupts peace. 79
As noted earlier, perhaps the strongest condemnation of withdrawal from
the Gaza Strip and other parts of the Land of Israel can be found in the
79 Interview by research staff with Anonymous Settler, in Gaza (May 25, 2005).
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Talmudic dictum Ye'Hareg Ve 'Al Ya 'Avor. Accepting this idea means that a
religious Jew puts withdrawal from the land on par with the sins of murder,
apostasy and incest. In this case as well, about two-thirds of those surveyed
agreed that "renunciation of any part of the Land of Israel is Ye'Hareg Ve 'Al
Ya 'Avor."
One rabbi we spoke to in the Gaza Strip explained that the issue of
protecting the settlements not only fit under the principle of Ye 'Hareg Ve 'Al
Ya 'Avor, but also that it demanded a Holy War:
As for Holy War, the Ramban 80 says that you should rather be killed rather
than flee. You must participate in a Holy War! ... The commandment is
stronger than the three sins of Ye 'Hareg Ve 'Al Ya'Avor, because in the case
of idol worship, incest and murder, if a m[a]n tells you: "kill your friend or I
will kill you," if you can run away you should do so, and if you are not able
to do so you must commit suicide. In contrast, in "Holy War" even if you
can run away it is forbidden. You are commanded to go into Holy War for
the Land of Israel, even if you might be killed. Without the sacrifice of our
first Pioneers we couldn't be here.., some values are above the value of
life.81
We also tried to tap more secular justifications for resorting to violence.
We asked a question that gauged whether settlers thought that withdrawal
from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was acceptable within the language
of normal Israeli politics. Is the withdrawal from these territories something
in which there can be normal political debate and disagreement? Or is it
something that stands outside the legitimate boundaries of political
discourse? When we asked settlers in the Gaza Strip whether "history will
judge those who assist in the evacuation of the settlements as traitors,"
almost eight in ten agreed.
These data suggest to us that the settlers not only believed that uprooting
of settlements was a serious violation of religious norms, but such actions
violated the boundaries of what is acceptable in normal politics. As one
settler told us: "The Land of Israel is not an inheritance. It is a legacy. Things
that I get as an inheritance are mine, if I so desire I can give it up. But a
80 Rabbi Moses Ben Nahman (1195-1270), also known by the Hebrew acronym
"Ramban" and the Latin designation "Nahmanides." Nahmanides was the foremost
halakhist of his age. His contributions cover every area of scholarship, distinguished both
in the legal dimension and the esoteric dimension. See AYROCHAM C. FEYER, A LET-rER
FOR THE AGES: IGGERES HARAMBAN, at xi-xii (1989).
81 Interview by research staff with Anonymous Settler, in Gaza (July 4, 2005).
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legacy is something that belongs to the Jewish people for all generations. It
cannot be relinquished. '82 Similarly, another settler told us:
The state of Israel will not be able to exist [if the government uproots
settlements]. It will fall to pieces, just collapse. Our battle is not for Gush
Katif. It's a war for faith, for believing in the Land of Israel as being sacred,
and not merely a real estate issue .... it [the disengagement] is the end of
Zionism. When the state of Israel decides to uproot Jewish settlements from
the Land of Israel, it declares itself as already misusing the mandate given
by the people of Israel. It means that the state becomes irrelevant. For what
reason was the state of Israel established? For what reason was the Israeli
parliament established, if not to settle the people of Israel in the Land of
Israel? Therefore, uprooting the people of Israel from the land means the
end [of the state]. My argument is that when the state misuses its authority it
ultimately loses its legitimacy and the authority of its governing and legal
systems is void. 83
B. Did the Settlers in Gaza Say They Were Willing to Use Violence
to Prevent a Withdrawal?
The data we have brought so far suggest that the settlers held radical
ideologies that can justify violence. But this raises another important question
in understanding what happened in the Gaza Strip. Perhaps, based on the
ideologies that they held, the settlers supported violence, but they were
constrained because the army or police prevented them from carrying out
violent acts. Later in our Paper, we will discuss the role of the army and the
police in the withdrawal, but at this point we want to focus specifically on
whether settlers suggested, during the weeks and days before the withdrawal,
that they would be willing to use violence.
In our survey, we asked respondents to describe their attitudes toward a
series of potential violent reactions to Israeli government attempts to uproot
settlements in Gush Katif and Northern Samaria. The potential reactions and
responses of Gaza settlers we surveyed are detailed in Table 4. We
distinguished support for violence between a settler's willingness to actively
participate in the violence from those who thought it was merely "legitimate
and appropriate." Negative settler attitudes toward violence included two
possible responses: those who thought it was "not desirable" (yet
understandable), and those who thought violence was "absolutely not
legitimate." Our results strongly suggest that the settlers did not support
82 Interview by research staff with Anonymous Settler, in Gaza (May 18, 2005).
83 Interview by research staff with Anonymous Settler, in Gaza (May 25, 2005).
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serious violence despite the radical views they held about the settlements and
the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Table 4: Support for Violence in Gaza
Aboutl NtI myself






ol te but I can and intending validlegitimate appropriate to act like
that
Violent Reaction














who wouldptp in 77.6% 20% 0.8% 1.6% 125participate in
uprooting Jews.
Violence against
Arabs in order to




(use of firearms). 96.9% 1.6% None 1.6% 127
Very few of the settlers that we surveyed in Gaza suggested that they
would be involved in any violence or active resistance. Only 6% said that
they would block traffic on roads. Only 8% said that they would use a
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physical response if "someone raised a hand to me or someone close to me."
Importantly, more than 40% of the settlers thought that these behaviors were
undesirable, and between 24% and 32% of the settlers we surveyed thought
these actions were "absolutely not legitimate."
When we turn to active acts of violence, support among settlers declines
further. Only a handful of settlers we surveyed claimed that they would
pierce tires or damage vehicles of security forces in reaction to a withdrawal.
Sixty-one percent told us that damaging property of the military was
"absolutely not legitimate" and only 8% said that such activities in a
response to government attempts to uproot settlements were "legitimate and
appropriate." Support for "physical violence against anyone who would
participate in uprooting Jews" and "violence against Arabs in order to
provoke Jewish/Arab conflict" elicited even less support in our survey. About
80% of settlers told us that these reactions were "absolutely not legitimate."
When we asked whether they would be willing to participate in a violent
revolt to combat government attempts to uproot settlements, 97% of settlers
we surveyed said that this action was "absolutely not legitimate."
The findings we have presented so far suggest that the lack of violence in
the Gaza withdrawal is because the Jewish population in the Gaza
settlements did not generally perceive serious violence as legitimate. But we
are faced with an interesting question. If the Gaza settlers expressed such
strongly held views about the settlements, why weren't they willing to resort
to violence? Given the radical nature of their ideologies about the Land of
Israel, what led them to see violence as illegitimate? The settlers saw a direct
connection between the coming of the Messiah and settlement in these
territories. And they placed withdrawal from the territories among the most
serious religious transgressions, and as a violation of the inherent values of a
Jewish state. If these are decisions a government cannot make, why were they
not willing to do more about it?
V. TOWARD A PERSPECTIVE OF NORMATIVE BALANCE
In understanding this seeming contradiction between the ideologies of
settlers and their willingness to resort to violence, we were drawn to a
theoretical perspective proposed more than fifty years ago by one of the
founding fathers of American criminology, Edwin Sutherland. Sutherland
proposed a theory of "differential associations" 84 and crime, in which he
recognized that individuals are confronted with many different and
84 See EDWiN H. SUTHERLAND, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 74-80 (Donald R.
Cressey ed., 6th ed. 1960).
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
countervailing influences. While Sutherland was primarily concerned with
how individuals, especially young people in a community, come to be
involved in crime, his perspective seems particularly relevant to
understanding the willingness, or seeming lack of willingness, of settlers to
use violence against the Israeli army or police.
Sutherland argued that there is a kind of balance that when upset leads
people to a willingness to violate the law. One central principle of his theory
of differential associations is that "[a] person becomes delinquent because of
an excess of definitions favorable to violation of law over definitions
unfavorable to violation of the law. This is the principle of differential
associations. It refers to both criminal and anticriminal associations and has
to do with counteracting forces." 85
While Sutherland's principle and theory have been applied primarily to
crime, we think his perspective is relevant to the problem of political
violence that we are examining. However, we are less interested in why
people turn violent than in understanding why they fail to turn violent. This
approach has recently become a central focus for criminologists who have
tried to explain the vast array of conformity in modern society as opposed to
acts of deviance. 86
We think that the lack of violence during the withdrawal from the Gaza
Strip can be understood in the context of what we define as a perspective of
"normative balance." In this context we draw from Sutherland's notion of a
85 Id. at 78 (emphasis in original).
86 Such theories are generally termed "control theories." Their main focus is not on
why offenders commit crime but rather on why the vast majority of people do not commit
crime. For a review of control theories see Charles R. Title, Refining Control Balance
Theory, 8 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 395 (2004); TRAviS HIRSCHI, CAUSES OF
DELINQUENCY (Transaction 2002) (explaining Hirschi's social bonds theory); Albert J.
Reiss, Jr., Delinquency as the Failure of Personal and Social Controls, 16 AM. Soc. REv.
196 (1951). In discussing his research results, Reiss notes the contribution researching
personal and social controls can have on predicting law-breaking:
In predicting delinquent recidivism, then, research might well be directed toward the
isolation of items which are measures of personal control re non-delinquent behavior
and items which are measures to the acceptance of or submission to institutions
which exercise control contra delinquent behavior. Such measures of personal and
social control may be expected to yield valid predictions of delinquent recidivism.
Id. at 207; see also MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIs HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY
OF CRIME 85-120 (1990); ROBERT J. SAMPSON & JOHN H. LAUB, CRIME IN THE MAKING:
PATHWAYS AND TURNING POINTS THROUGH LIFE 18, 67, 139-178 (1993); Karen Heimer
& Matsueda Ross, Role Taking, Role Commitment and Delinquency: A Theory of
Differential Social Control, 59 AM. Soc. REv. 365, 365-371 (1994).
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set of countervailing pressures pushing and pulling potential offenders to and
from criminal activity. While settlers expressed norms regarding the land and
settlement that would naturally lead to illegality and serious violence, they
also claimed to support norms that emphasized their connections to the larger
society and that acted to constrain the potential for violence. Yair Sheleg
reported on such conflicting norms when describing the efforts of rabbis in
the settlement movement to moderate possible protests against the
government:
Paradoxically, the rabbinical elite of the settler movement, its older leaders,
assert uncompromising claims about preserving all of Eretz Yisrael
[Hebrew term for the Land of Israel]. But, at the same time, they believe in
the holiness of the Jewish state as a whole and not just the holiness of the
land. The combination of these beliefs has led them to moderate the steps
that they allow the settlers to take in protest.87
We believe that normative balance provides a strong explanation for the
lack of settler support for violence in the Gaza Strip and the subsequent lack
of violence in the withdrawal itself. Balancing norms are strongly evidenced
in our survey. In Table 5 we present three items that reflect this element of
normative balance among Gaza settlers.
When we asked settlers whether "the unity of the Jewish people and the
existence of the State of Israel are more important than the territories" (i.e.
Judea, Samaria and Gaza), almost two-thirds agreed. An even larger number
of the settlers told us that they agree that "I must respect the law and
government decisions even if I personally disagree with them." And only
11% disagreed that "as a democratic state, Israel must be tolerant of a wide
range of different opinions and ways of life."'88
87 Susskind et al., supra note 2, at 190.
88 Settlers often interpreted this concept in terms of the importance of society taking
their views into account. Many settlers viewed the lack of a referendum approving the
withdrawal as proof that the withdrawal was "undemocratic."
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Table 5: Balancing Norms in Gaza
Agreement Level A central N
:B:ancnL ~mstenet I agree I disagree validBalancing Norms tenet.
I must respect the law and
government decisions even if I 11.5% 55.8% 32.7% 113
personally disagree with them.
The unity of the Jewish people and
the existence of the state of Israel 20% 41.8% 38.2% 110
are more important than territories.
As a democratic state, Israel must
be tolerant of a wide range of 24.4% 64.2% 11.4% 123
different opinions and ways of life. II
While we think that these data support a perspective of normative
balance in the settlements, it is interesting to note that while settlers agree
generally with these norms, fewer settlers see such norms as "a central tenet"
of their beliefs as compared with the ideological variables we examined
earlier. This may be because the ideological variables we examined were
related directly to settlement enterprise, while these statements are a more
general measure. It may imply that such ideological perspectives are in some
ways more salient. However, our qualitative interviews suggest that
balancing norms are relevant to the decisions of settlers to avoid more
serious violence. For example, one settler tried to bring us to understand how
he could believe so strongly that the removal of settlements was a "crime"
and at the same time he could be against violence:
One might think that blocking roads only damages our cause-it creates
antagonism. It's the opposite of what we are wishing to gain-to create
connections to the people. Other people say that we must create a rupture;
we must make people understand that this is something that just cannot be
done. I prefer the first way, which unites instead of ruins. Nevertheless I still
look at this plan with the utmost severity and I think it is a crime to do
something like this. We believe that the right way is to increase light instead
of creating darkness. The solution is in increasing love and working to
create unity instead of creating a rupture. The settlers here love the people
of Israel. 89
For this settler, as others, the withdrawal represented a terrible offense on
the part of the government. But it was equally unacceptable for settlers to use
89 Interview by research staff with Anonymous Settler in Gaza (Apr. 6, 2005).
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violence against other Jews.
Noting the connections between other Israelis and the settlers, another
Gaza settler described the tension between his religious beliefs in the
centrality of the Land of Israel and his recognition that the soldiers and
settlers are his "brothers." This parallels Edwin Sutherland's original theory
of differential associations, which emphasizes the social networks that tie
individuals to law abiding or law breaking groups. 90 As one settler explained:
Militant people see reality in only black and white .... The way I
understand Judaism, it has many colors, each and everything has
nuances ... it's not that the Land of Israel is not important for me. I'm
struggling for it and I don't want to lose pieces of "Eretz Yisrael." It is
fundamental in my beliefs... I think that the Land of Israel is very
important but people who concentrate only on the importance of the land
fail to see the importance of the unity of the people of Israel .... We will
not be able to exist in the Land of Israel without the unity of the nation. I
think that the importance of the people of Israel precede the Land of
Israel.91
Another settler from the West Bank expressed similar sentiments:
Rabbis say that if the disengagement happens we need to leave quietly. We
should be there until the very last minute, full with sadness and agony, but
the government made a decision.... In the Torah the importance of the
settlement is immense. But it is not only a'matter of am I going to obey the
words of the Torah, it is also a matter of the possibility of a civil war. If I
resist a soldier I create an opening for a civil war. This soldier that will
come to evacuate me is my brother.92
Taken together, these findings support our perspective of normative
balance in understanding the lack of violence observed in the Gaza Strip. In
our view, countervailing norms restrained settlers from following what
would appear to be a natural progression to violence based on their radical
90 See SUTHERLAND, supra note 84, at 78. The third principle in his explanation of
criminal behavior is that, "The principal part of the learning of criminal behavior
occurs within intimate personal groups," and the fifth principle is that, "The specific
direction of motives and drives is learned from definitions of the legal codes as
favorable or unfavorable. In some societies an individual.., is surrounded by persons
whose definitions are favorable to the violation of the legal codes." Id. (emphasis in
original) (emphasizing the importance of social network ties).
91 Interview by research staff with Anonymous Settler in Gaza (Apr. 14, 2005).
92 Interview by research staff with Anonymous Settler in Samaria (May 9, 2005).
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beliefs concerning settlement and the Land of Israel. On the one hand, they
believed government actions to be illegitimate and criminal, and they
believed those actions would hinder the redemption of the Jewish people.
The settlers were strongly committed to these norms which apparently
provided possible justification for violence. On the other hand, however,
settlers were also committed to balancing norms which emphasized their
connections to the entire Jewish people, and the importance of respecting the
laws of the State even if they did not agree with them. This tension, in our
view, is important in explaining the lack of settler violence despite the
government's uprooting of Jewish settlements in the Land of Israel.
A. Normative Balance and the Approach of the Army and Police
While the attitudes of settlers help us to understand the low level of
violence in the withdrawal, we also think the approach of the Israeli army
and the police helped reinforce the normative balance model we have
described. In the months preceding the withdrawal, the army took an
approach of "engaging" the settlers, adopting the slogan "Sensitivity and
Firmness. '93 This was a very unusual approach in the context of the culture
of Israeli society, where people often react directly and immediately to
affronts. To take an approach of not reacting to insults or verbal challenges,
and to be sensitive to the context of the settler situation, represented an
important statement regarding the way in which the army and the police
perceived the settlers. Reinforcing this approach, the security forces
announced that they would not carry any type of weapons into the
93 Meir Elran, Domestic Effects of the Disengagement, 8 STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT
(Nov. 2005), available at http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v8n3p5Elran.html. Elran notes that:
"The motto that the 1DF coined for the operation-'sensitivity and determination'-
reflected the careful operational planning and emotional preparation for the
disengagement." Id. Hirsh Goodman, The Disengagement and Israel's Media Strategy, 8
STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT, Nov. 2005, http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v8n3p8Goodman.html.
Goodman states:
The mission the army was being asked to conduct, was qualitatively different from
other missions, including forcibly removing people from their homes, most of them
law abiding citizens, some of whom had lived in Gush Katif for thirty years.
Therefore in carrying out this mission the IDF had to show sensitivity as well as
determination. Indeed, those two words, sensitivity and determination, became the
working title of the IDF's media plan for the disengagement itself.
Id.
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settlements when they came to uproot settlers. 94
This approach of "sensitivity" emphasized the connections between
settlers and the authorities that had come to remove them. Soldiers and police
were trained beforehand not to overreact to settlers and to treat them as much
as possible as "brothers. '95 Reflecting this, Picture 4 shows a group of
soldiers praying with a rabbi from the settlements, holding arms around each
other as they pray.96 Certainly, such scenes reflect the security forces'
intention to emphasize the values and norms that are shared between the
soldiers, police and settlers, and thus reinforce the normative balance model
we described above.
Picture 4: Israeli soldiers pray with a rabbi from the settlements.
Of course, one reason why there was little violence was simply that the
security forces overwhelmed the settlers. About 50,000 soldiers and police
94BBC NEWS ONLINE, Troops Practive Gaza Evacuation, July 26, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4718081.stm.
95 Ari Shavit, "We'll embrace the settlers and take them with us, " HAARETZ NEWS
ONLINE, Aug. 15, 2005,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=612487.
96 BAMBALI NEWS WEB SITE, Online Image, Gaza Strip, Nissanit, Aug. 15, 2005,
http://www.bambili.com/b gallery/view pic id.asp?pic id=35481 &my lang=2.
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officers took part in the removal of settlers.97 The Israeli security forces
sought to present a portrait of overwhelming numbers. While this certainly
helped to dampen possible violence, we think that the countervailing values
we have described, and the reinforcement of such values during the
withdrawal, played a key role in preventing violence.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE WITHDRAWALS IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA
Given the strong likelihood of the uprooting of settlements in future
withdrawals from the West Bank,9 8 we think it is particularly important to
examine the data from settlements in Judea and Samaria. Do we find a
similar set of countervailing norms in the settlements we studied? If this is
the case, we might expect a future withdrawal to follow the pattern we
observed in the Gaza Strip. At the same time, a recent government attempt in
February of 2006 to remove illegal settlers from an outpost called Amona in
the Samaria region led to serious conflicts between settlers and Israeli
soldiers and police.99 While a government report has criticized the security
forces in this case for using unnecessary force, 10 0 the events there suggest
that future withdrawals will be met by significantly more serious settler
97 See ISRAEL INSIDER NEWS ONLINE, Operation "Brotherly Hand" Brings Both
Soldiers and Settlers to Tears, Aug. 15, 2005,
http://web.israelinsider.com/Articles/Politics/6313.htrrL
98 See Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Address to the Knessett on Presentation of 3 1'
Government May 4, 2006), available at
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israei+Leaders/2006/Address+to
+Knesset+by+PM+Olmert+on+presentation+of+31 st+government+4-May-2006.htm.
Prime Minister Olmert stated:
The disengagement from the Gaza Strip and Northern Samaria was an essential first
step.., but the main part is still ahead. The continued dispersal of settlements
throughout Judea and Samaria creates an inseparable mixture of populations which
will endanger the existence of the State of Israel as a Jewish state .... [P]artition of
the land for the purpose of guaranteeing a Jewish majority is the lifeline of
Zionism. I know how hard it is, especially for the settlers and those faithful to Eretz
Israel, but I am convinced, with all my heart, that it is necessary.
Id.
99 See Effrat Weiss, Amona Evacuated.- Hundreds Hurt, YNET NEWS ONLINE, Jan. 2,
2006, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3209330,00.html.
100 See THE KNESSET INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE INTO AMONA EVENTS, INTERIM
REPORT 16-27, 31 (Mar. 19, 2006),
http://www.knesset.gov.il/committees/heb/docs/bitachon.htm (in Hebrew).
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violence.101
Overall, our quantitative data regarding ideological variables that might
justify violence in the West Bank follow in general form our findings in the
Gaza Strip. 10 2 In Table 6, we compare support for ideological items that
might be expected to justify violence across the three regions we examined.
For simplification we combined the percent that agree with the statement or
consider it a "central tenet of their beliefs" into a simple "I agree" category.
As is apparent, the vast majority of settlers in all three regions believe that
settling Judea, Samaria and Gaza are "part of the process of the redemption
of Israel" and that "history will judge those who assist evacuating the
settlements as traitors." The proportions of settlers who see retention of the
West Bank and Gaza as a principle of Ye 'Hereg Va 'Al Ya 'Avor are lower but
also similar across the regions. Only in the case of the measure, "a
withdrawal from Yesha will prevent Geulat Israel," do we find statistically
significant differences between the three regions, and here the differences are
not large in absolute terms. While 78% of Samaria settlers and 70% of Gaza
settlers agreed with this statement, only 58% of settlers in Judea agreed.
101 Id. at 4. Yoval Shtinitz, the committee chairman, notes that:
On Wednesday morning, February 1, 2006... [there were] thousands of
protestors, and facing them large military and police forces. . . by the eve of
that day... more than 220 wounded people were urgently
sent to hospitals... during the disengagement events, in the summer of 2005,
[in which] hundreds of homes and structures were destroyed... about 9,000
settlers and larger numbers of protestors were evacuated with their assent or by
force, only a few needed medical care
Id. (translated from Hebrew by the authors).
102 We did consider the possibility that our data drawn before the withdrawal in the
West Bank differed substantively from data collected in the survey in the month after the
withdrawal. However, we did not find statistically important differences between our
West Bank samples before and after the withdrawal, so they were combined in these
analyses.
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Table 6: Region Comparison for Items that May Justify Violence*
Samaria Judea Gaza
4 r 4 , +




is part of the
process of the



















*Questions were recoded into a binary level of measurement. The
percent" includes: "I agree," and "A central tenet of my world view."
above "agreement
**Statistical significance is estimated using ChiSquare tests comparing the three regions.
We also found strong evidence of balancing norms in the settlements we
studied in Judea and Samaria, illustrated in Table 7. This suggests that in the
West Bank, like the Gaza Strip, there are strong countervailing norms likely
to constrain violence. Almost 80% of settlers in the Samaria settlements and
almost 90% of settlers we surveyed in Judea believed that, "as a democratic
state, Israel must tolerate different opinions." About two-thirds of settlers in
Samaria and almost three-quarters of settlers in Judea also believed that "the
unity of the Jewish people and the existence of the state of Israel are more
important than the territories."
Nonetheless, we do find statistically significant and important
differences when comparing the settlers of Gaza and Samaria. Such
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Samaria. For example, more than two-thirds of the Judea and Gaza settlers
agreed with the need to "respect the law and government decisions," whereas
less than 50% of the Samaria settlers we surveyed concurred. There are also
statistically significant differences between the regions regarding the need for
tolerance of differing opinions. Again, Samaria settlers were less likely than
others to believe that "as a democratic state Israel must be tolerant of a range
of different opinions and ways of life."











I must respect the law
and government
decisions even if I 118 48.3% 71 67.6% 113 67.3 P<.005
personally disagree %
with them.
The unity of the
Jewish people and the
existence of the state 96 65.6% 70 74.3% 110 61.8 N.S
of Israel are more %
important than the
territories.
As a democratic state,
Israel must be tolerant
of a wide range of 118 77.1% 78 89.7% 123 88.6 P<.05
different opinions and %
ways of life.
*Questions were recoded into a binary level of measurement. The above "I agree"
percent includes responses "I agree" and "A central tenet of my world view."
**Statistical significance is estimated using ChiSquare tests comparing the three regions.
An important question is whether this difference in the predominance of
balancing norms is also reflected in the settlers' willingness to actually resist
removal. We report in Table 8 the proportion of settlers in each region that
said they viewed the reaction either as legitimate or that they intended to act
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Blocking traffic on 118 46.6% 76 23.7% 122 34.4% P<.005
roads.
Piercing tires and
damaging vehicles of 122 56.1% 77 24.2% 123 19.7% P<.005
the army or police.
Physical response
toward someone who
would raise his/her 123 26.8% 75 6.7% 120 27.5% P<.005
hand to me, or
anyone close to me.
Physical response




Arabs in order to 119 6.7% 77 None 120 2.5% P<.02
provoke Jewish-Arab
conflict.
Violent revolt (use of 120 4.2% 78 None 127 1.6% N.S
firearms).
*For the first three reactions, statistical significance is estimated using ChiSquare tests
comparing the three regions. It was not possible to conduct such tests because of the low base
rate for the last three reactions. In these cases statistical significance is calculated using
Fisher's exact tests comparing Samaria and a pooled estimate for Judea and Gaza.
All of the comparisons except for "violent revolt" show a statistically
significant difference between the regions. The differences in turn are often
large. The Samaria settlers were more likely than others to support violent
actions. More than half of the Samaria settlers believed piercing tires and
damaging military vehicles was at least a legitimate response, while only
20% of settlers in Gaza concurred. The base rate of agreement in the
measures reflecting higher levels of violence is very low overall in all three
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serious acts of violence as legitimate. More than three times as many Samaria
settlers than Gaza settlers we studied believed it was appropriate to
physically respond to someone enforcing the withdrawal. In turn, Samaria
settlers were more than twice as likely as Gaza settlers to believe in the
legitimacy of instigating violence against Arabs in order to provoke
Jewish/Arab conflict. While the absolute numbers here are very small (8.3%
versus 2.4%; 6.7% versus 2.5%), Samaria settlers in our sample are more
likely to endorse violent reactions to withdrawal.
These findings suggest that countervailing norms are less prevalent in the
Samaria region, and that given our perspective of normative balance, the
likelihood of violence is also greater among the settlers we studied in those
areas. Our qualitative interviews also suggest that the potential for violence in
Samaria and the West Bank is greater than what we observed in the Gaza
Strip. Indeed, we find that there are small groups of settlers in these areas that
seem to have few balancing values, and who appear to be especially prone to
violent resistance. For example, one Samaria settler told us:
We must fight hard for the Land of Israel. We shouldn't give it to the Arabs.
We must fight until the end.., we must fight like crazy people. The youth,
who went to prison this week: it's heroism! We should act. There must be
violence... Jews are taken out of their homes. A man with respect must
fight for his home. 103
This narrative differed markedly from those we commonly heard in our
conversations with settlers in the Gaza Strip, where few settlers expressed
support for serious violence. Moreover, we found that some settlers from the
West Bank not only expressed a lack of support for the norm of the unity of
the people of Israel, but alienation and even hatred of other Israelis who had
decided to uproot settlements. As one settler told us:
Did you hear what I say-I hate those people [Israelis for withdrawal]. If I
hate someone, how do you think I should treat him? I feel cheated. I feel
like they stole what is mine. How [do] you think I should feel? Being a
good guy? We will take the gloves offl 104
103 Interview by research staff with Anonymous Settler, in Samaria (May 20, 2005).
104 Interview by research staff with Anonymous Settler, in Judea (Mar. 30, 2005).
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VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We began with the question of why there was so little violence by
settlers in the August 2005 withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Our conclusion,
based on scores of interviews and a survey of settlers, is that the lack of
violence in the Gaza Strip was not surprising. This was not because the Gaza
settlers were moderate in their beliefs. On the contrary, we have much
evidence that settlers there were committed to ideas that could easily have
led to violence. As we illustrated earlier, most settlers believed that uprooting
settlements would prevent the messianic redemption of Israel. Most argued
that those who planned the withdrawal would be judged as traitors. And most
thought that evacuating settlements constituted a sin so great that a Jew
should be willing to be killed rather than comply with it. For them, settlement
evacuation was tantamount to murder or apostasy.
In this sense, the settlers in Gaza were radicals whose beliefs clearly
created a potential for violence. But we also found that balancing norms were
strongly held values in the settlements. Almost two-thirds of the settlers we
surveyed told us that they believed that the unity of the Jewish people and the
existence of Israel were more important than the territories. The settlers also
showed strong respect for democratic principles. A similar majority said that
Israel as a democratic state must be tolerant of a wide range of opinions, and
agreed that they should respect government decisions even if they disagree
with them.
In this context, it is not hard to understand the lack of violent resistance
to the security forces during the withdrawal from the Gaza strip. The settlers
provide a good example of what we have described as a model of normative
balance. While they had strong ideological beliefs that might naturally lead
to violence, they held equally strong balancing norms that militated against
it. Accordingly, in our survey, almost none of the Gaza settlers said that they
supported violent resistance in any form. Our qualitative interviews painted a
similar portrait. Of course, part of the credit for the lack of violence must be
given to the government, army and police, who worked hard to reinforce the
idea that all Israelis are all part of one nation, thereby buttressing the
balancing norms that were already part of the Gaza settlers' worldview.
We also asked what our data suggest regarding future withdrawals in the
West Bank. It is a tricky question because it is reasonable to assume that the
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip was a constitutive event which had the
potential to modify settler beliefs and norms. The disengagement might have
led settlers to believe that the strategy of primarily non-violent resistance that
they employed was a mistake (since the withdrawal was not prevented),
thereby pushing them to adopt more forceful methods of struggle in the
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future. Other settlers may draw the opposite conclusions and shift efforts to
build more connections with other Israelis. There is a clear need for further
research in order to study the ideology and beliefs of settlers following the
disengagement. Our research was limited to a specific strongly ideological
group of settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip at the time of the
disengagement.
With these caveats in mind, we think that our data provide important
insight into what is likely to happen in future withdrawals. Our interviews
and surveys in these settlements suggest that the idea of normative balance
which is likely to discourage violence is salient not only for Gaza settlers but
also for those in Judea and Samaria. However, we did find significant
differences between settlers in the three regions in their support of violent
reactions to future withdrawals. These findings are troubling in terms of what
they suggest about future withdrawals, should they occur.
The differences were most pronounced in the settlements we studied in
Samaria, the northern part of the West Bank, where we found settlers
significantly less likely to express balancing norms. For example, fewer
believed that they should respect and obey government decisions even if they
disagree with them. Not surprisingly, we also found more willingness to
support violence, although the vast majority of settlers opposed serious
violent resistance. Our research, then, suggests that future withdrawals are
likely to meet with more rather than less violence, a conclusion reinforced by
the February 2006 clashes between settlers and security forces in the illegal
settlement of Amona. The normative balance that ensured a peaceful
withdrawal from Gaza is less apparent in the West Bank, at least in
settlements we examined in Samaria.
There is also evidence of a growing confrontational attitude on the part
of the authorities toward the settlers. A government commission concluded
that security forces used excessive force in removing settlers in Amona. 10 5
The newly appointed Defense Minister and head of the Labor Party, Amir
Peretz, has also taken a much tougher line with settlers, vowing in June of
2006 that "the evacuation of the outposts will start in two weeks ... and we
will start with outposts in which there is violence towards policemen,
soldiers and Palestinian citizens. '' 10 6
105 THE KNESSET INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE INTO AMONA EVENTS, INTERIM
REPORT, supra note 100, at 16-27.
106 MA'ARIV NEWS ONLINE, When Freedom of Expression is Taken, Violence is
Likely to Occur, June 25, 2006, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART1/439/825.html.
Quoting Defense Minister Amir Peretz: "Maintaining Law and Order is the first priority
for me... the evacuation will take place in these places where settlers take the law into
their own hands and do not respect the rule of law in Israel." Id. The article continues:
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Our research suggests that adopting a tough "zero-tolerance" approach
might backfire, because it will tend to reduce the influence and legitimacy of
balancing norms among the broader settlement population. Our data also
suggest that the present government would be well served to heed the
approach of its predecessor. The more the government emphasizes
connections between settlers and other Israelis, the more balancing norms are
reinforced that prevent violence.
While we think that our data help to understand the potential for violence
and its control among settlers in Israel, we think they also have a broader set
of implications for prevention of political violence. Evidence of the influence
of countervailing values can be found in other national settings. For example,
in a recent United States Institute of Peace study in India examining deadly
ethnic riots, the authors found that lack of inter-ethnic local networks
(between Hindu and Muslim) was the single most important predictor of
whether a community would respond violently to ethnic provocation. 0 7 That
study suggests that a strategy that focuses on building stronger inter-ethnic
civic associations at the community level might prove effective in reducing
the level of violent ethnic riots in India.'0 8 Its findings are certainly
consistent with the perspective of normative balance that we have proposed.
Our data suggest that violence by communities with radical ideologies
can be constrained by encouraging countervailing norms and strong ties to
the larger societies in which these groups are found. Moreover, this approach
of engagement and contact appears to restrain violence even when support
for the core ideologies of violence remains unchanged. We think our data
point to the significance of normative balance as a method for reducing
violence and conflict.
This approach appears to run counter to other recent ideas to
counteracting the roots of terrorism, which emphasize the importance of
[R]ight-wing followers are furious due to the prime minister's call for "restriction
orders" for right-wing activists, who are characterized by the security services as
"dangerous."... The right-wing activist Itamar Ben Gvir said that "the government
'mouth closing' will not help," and his colleague, Baruch Marzel, said that "Peretz is
stimulating hatred and polarization," and that "it might lead to bloodshed."
Id. (translated from Hebrew by the authors)
10 7 UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, LETHAL ETHNIC RIOTS: LESSONS FROM
INDIA AND BEYOND 8 (February 2003), available at
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/srl01.pdf.
108 Id. at 10-11.
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changing the beliefs of communities from which terrorism emerges. 109 Our
study suggests a different approach that is perhaps more realistic given the
strongly held beliefs of groups like Jewish settlers. In this approach, one
would try to build countervailing norms to restrain violence rather than
reform and change the core ideologies of radical groups.
109 See Philip C. Wilcox, Jr., The Terror, in STRIKING TERROR: AMERICA'S NEW
WAR 5, 11 (Robert B. Silvers & Baraba Epstein eds., 2002) supporting an approach that
would emphasize common values in combating international terrorism:
We should also search for ways to strengthen the common bonds between Western
values and Islam in order to combat the notion of a "clash of civilizations" and to
weaken the Islamic extremist fringe that hates the West and supports terrorist
actions. Such new departures in US foreign policy would require devoting far
greater resources to supporting a more engaged, cooperative, and influential
American role abroad. Redefining national security and counterterrorism in this
broader sense is the most promising way to fight the war against terrorism.
Id. at 11-12.
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